Optimal three-part tariff plans by Fibich, G et al.
LBS Research Online
G Fibich, R Klein, O Koenigsberg and E Muller
Optimal three-part tariff plans
Article
This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/
835/
Fibich, G, Klein, R, Koenigsberg, O and Muller, E
(2017)
Optimal three-part tariff plans.
Operations Research, 65 (5). pp. 1177-1189. ISSN 0030-364X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1609
INFORMS
c© 2017 INFORMS
Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of
research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is
not permitted.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2599985 
Optimal Three-Part Tariff Plans
Gadi Fibich∗ Roy Klein† Oded Koenigsberg‡ Eitan Muller§
December, 2016
Abstract
Service providers, such as cell phone carriers, often offer three-part tariff plans
that consist of three levers: A fixed fee, an allowance of free units, and a price per each
unit above the allowance. In previous studies the optimal three-part tariff contract
was characterized using the standard first-order conditions approach. Because this
optimization problem is non-smooth, however, it could only be solved in a few simple
cases. In this study we employ a different methodology which is based on obtaining a
global bound for the firm profit, and then showing that this bound is attained by the
optimal plan. This approach allows us to explicitly calculate the optimal three-part
tariff plan under quite general conditions, where consumers are rational, they have
a general utility function, they experience psychological costs when they exceed the
number of free units, they have deterministic or stochastic consumption rates, they
are homogeneous or heterogeneous, and the firm costs are fixed or depend on the
usage level.
1 Introduction
Three-part tariff plans consist of a fixed fee (access price), the number of free units (usage
allowance), and the price per unit above the number of free units (overage price). These
contracts are popular in service industries such as the telecommunication industry (charg-
ing for each minute above the monthly allowance), car rentals (charging for miles above
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a mileage allowance), flights (charging for additional services), and internet data storage.
In this study we explicitly compute the optimal three-part tariff plan when consumers act
rationally. We extend on previous work by considering consumers with a general valuation
function and with a deterministic or random consumption rate. The consumers may be
homogeneous or heterogeneous, and the firm cost may or may not depend on the usage
level. We also take into account that consumers may incur a psychological cost when they
exceed their allowance. For ease of exposition, we refer to the cellular phone market and
use of cellular calling minutes as our unit of analysis.
Calculating the optimal firm strategy in the presence of rational consumers involves
two nested optimization problems. The “inner” optimization problem is the calculation of
the optimal strategy for consumers for any given three-part plan. From this calculation
one obtains the firm’s revenue from rational consumers under any three-part plan. Then
the “outer” optimization problem is the calculation of the optimal three-part plan that
maximizes the firm’s revenue. Unfortunately, both the utility of the consumer and the
firm revenue are non-smooth at the point where the number of minutes used is equal to the
monthly allowance. Since this nested optimization problem is non-smooth, the standard
optimization approach, which is based on first-order conditions, leads to extremely long
calculations that can only be solved in a few simple cases. For that reason, there have been
few analytical results in the literature on optimal three-part tariffs plans.
In this study we avoid the non-smoothness obstacle by adopting a different methodology,
whereby we obtain a global bound on the firms revenue under any three-part plan, and
then find a plan that attains that bound. Therefore, this plan has to be optimal. This
approach allows us to handle problems that are intractable using first-order conditions.
Moreover, any plan that attains this bound is a global maximum, in contrast with the
first-order conditions approach, where even if a solution can be found, it is not always
clear whether it corresponds to a local or global maximum or minimum.
As noted, we assume that consumers are rational decision-makers who seek to maximize
their utility, which is the difference between their service value (service utility) from the
minutes that they use, and the sum of (i) the monetary price that they pay to the firm and
(ii) the psychological cost that they incur when they exceed the free minutes allowance.
We allow for the consumers’ usage rate to be deterministic or stochastic. The latter case
corresponds to situations where consumers either cannot expect or cannot control how
many minutes they will use (as is the case in the U.S. mobile market where consumers pay
for incoming calls).
2
We find that when the firm costs are independent of consumers’ usage and consumers
are homogeneous, the optimal strategy for the firm is to let consumers use as many minutes
as they want, which effectively reduces the three-part tariff plan to a fixed-price contract.
This result, as well as all subsequent results, hold regardless of whether the usage rate is
deterministic or stochastic. Thus, the firm sets a sufficiently high allowance, guaranteeing
that consumers never exceed it. Therefore, consumers attain their maximal service value.
Then the firm sets the fixed fee to be equal to consumers’ maximal service value, which
effectively reduces the consumers’ overall utility to zero. In this contract, the marginal price
per minute is irrelevant. We also find that the firm’s revenue decreases as the consumer
consumption rate becomes more stochastic.
The above result may seem to suggest that in the case of homogeneous consumers, a
three-part tariff plan is not needed. However, allowing consumers to use as many minutes
as they want is not the optimal strategy when the firm incurs a cost for every minute
that consumers talk. In such a case, the firm should set a usage allowance, and prevent
consumers from exceeding it by charging a sufficiently high per-minute overage price. The
usage allowance threshold is the point at which the consumers’ marginal service value from
talking becomes equal to the firm’s marginal cost. Therefore, even when consumers are
homogeneous, a three-part plan is needed if the firm cost are taken into account.
To investigate the case in which consumers are heterogeneous, we divide them into two
segments of heavy and light users. We analyze this problem under both deterministic and
stochastic demand. A priori, when the firm offers one plan for all users, there are two
potential optimal strategies. The first is to target the heavy consumers exclusively. In this
case, the firm allows the heavy users to talk as much as they want, and sets the fixed fee
to be equal to their maximal valuation from talking. The light consumers do not join the
plan, because the fixed fee is too high for them. The second strategy is to target both
consumer segments. The intuitive contract in that case is to maximize the firm’s profit
from light consumers through the fixed fee by allowing them to talk as much as they want,
and then maximize the extra profits from the heavy users with a proper choice of the
per-minute overage charge. Interestingly, however, this contract is sub-optimal. Rather,
both the fixed fee and the usage allowance should be lower than those that extract the
maximal profit from the light users. The firm can also choose to offer two three-part tariff
plans: One that allows the light ones to talk as much as they want, and a second plan
that maximizes the revenues from the heavy users. Adding a second plan increases the
firm profits, compared to a single plan. Even with two plans, however, allowing the light
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users to talk as much as they want is always suboptimal. Whether the firm should focus
on the heavy users exclusively or on all users, depends on the level of heterogeneity in the
consumers’ valuations and on the ratio of the number of heavy to light users.
1.1 Literature Review
Nonlinear pricing was studied in the economics, operations research, and marketing lit-
erature. Most of the literature on three-part tariff plans is empirical or numerical, and
only a single paper calculated the optimal three-part tariff plan analytically. Lambrecht,
Seim, and Skiera (2007) considered a three-part tariff under uncertainty associated with
internet data packages. They set up a quadratic utility function and estimated the de-
mand. They did not, however, determine the optimal packages. Rather they measured the
consumers preferences for flat-rate plans relative to pay-per-use plans and found it to be
significant. Iyengar, Jedidi, and Kohli (2008) considered three-part tariff plans for mobile
phone services. They used conjoint data to estimate the model parameters, and then used
a grid search to compute the optimal plans numerically. Iyengar Ansari, and Gupta (2007)
analyzed data from a single wireless service provider. They developed a model for plan
choice and consumption that incorporates consumers’ usage uncertainty and consumers’
learning for service quality and usage. Ascarza, Lambrecht and Vilcassim (2012) consid-
ered the effect of the free allowance part on the consumers choice in a three-part tariff
pricing. The setting was that the firms add a three-part tariff plan to their existing menu
that consisted exclusively of two-part tariff plans. Optimal packages, however, were not
one of the objectives of these papers.
Iyengar, Ansari and Gupta (2007) and Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2007) considered
the randomness of the consumption rate. In those studies, the consumer chooses the
optimal number of minutes assuming he has a deterministic consumption rate. Only then,
the uncertainty in the consumption rate is taken into account by the consumer (who
decided whether to join the plan) and by the firm (in determining its expected profits). In
our model, the consumer chooses his desired consumption rate while taking into account the
uncertainty in his/her consumption rate. This makes the consumer optimization problem
more challenging to compute, but the model more realistic.
Several studies on nonlinear pricing in service industries examined two-part tariff plans.
Essegaier et al. (2002) computed the optimal two-part tariff plan under constraints on ser-
vice capacity and heterogeneous consumer use. They assumed that usage rates of individual
consumers vary, and that the marginal cost of serving a customer is low and independent of
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the consumers usage rate. They showed that flat-fee pricing is the only sustainable pricing
structure once the industry has developed sufficient excess capacity. Cachon and Feldman
(2011) asked whether a firm should charge per use or sell subscriptions when congestion is
unavoidable, and found that subscription pricing is preferable, despite its limitations with
respect to congestion.
A few studies investigated some characteristics of three-part tariff pricing (see Huang
(2008) and Kim et al. (2010) for a review of those studies). None of these studies, however,
calculated the optimal three-part tariff plan. For example, Bagh and Bhargava (2013)
analyzed the ability of alternative nonlinear pricing structures to price discriminate. They
showed that three-part tariffs are more efficient than two-part tariffs as price-discriminating
mechanisms for heterogeneous consumers.
We are only aware of a single paper that calculated optimal three-part tariff optimiza-
tion problem analytically. Grubb (2009) computed the optimal three-part tariff plan when
consumers are overconfident, by assuming that each consumer has an estimated demand
and an actual demand and chose a plan based on the estimated demand. He showed that
for consumers who are not overconfident, the firms optimal strategy is to offer a plan that
has a high fixed fee and thus takes all of the surplus of the consumers. Furthermore, the
firm earns a greater profit when consumers are overconfident. In that model, the firm knows
both the estimated and actual demand of the consumers, but consumers only know their
estimated demand. We consider a different situation of symmetric information between the
firm and the consumers. In addition, in Grubb’s model, consumers have a pre-determined
number of minutes that they want to use. Therefore, they only have to decide whether to
join the calling plan. In our model, the number of minutes consumers want to use depends
on the calling plan parameters. Hence, our model leads to a nested optimization problem,
whereas Grubb’s model does not.
Our paper can also be linked to the rich literature on product lines that dates back
to the seminal paper by Mussa and Rosen (1978) (see also Moorthy (1984), Johnson and
Myatt (2003), and Villas-Boas (2004)). In the models in those studies, consumers differed
in how much they valued product quality. The firm knew the distribution of consumers
taste for quality but could not identify the tastes of individual consumers. The firm
offered multiple products and consumers self-selected the product that matched their tastes.
In our work, consumers differ in preferred rates of consumption. The firm knows the
distribution of consumers taste for consumption but cannot identify the tastes of individual
consumers. The firm offers three-part tariff contracts (more, obviously, when it offers
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multiple three-part contracts), and consumers self-select how many minutes to consume
given their contract plan, which is a de facto differentiation of consumer segments based
on their preferences. Their self-selection creates a product line in which the products differ
according to the individuals rates of consumption. A firm offering two three-part tariff
contracts is equivalent to introduction of a regular product line if the overage price is
decided by a regulator or any other external entity. The firm chooses the fixed fees and
usage allowances, which correspond to the products prices and levels of quality. Therefore,
the time allowances act as the perceived quality of the plans, and customers self-select
a package, which is equivalent to choosing different products (quality and price). The
equivalence breaks down, however, when an overage price is added. In that case, the three-
part tariff contracts are equivalent to consumers buying additional bits of quality for an
additional price that is decided by the firm. Our paper also relates to studies of product
lines that capture heterogeneity in consumers consumption rates. In Koenigsberg et al.
(2010), for example, the authors model a firms decisions about quality, price, and package
size when the consumption rate is exogenous. In our study, each consumers consumption
rate is a decision variable determined by the underlying distribution of the consumption
rate, the consumers degree of uncertainty, and the contract parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we compute the optimal three-part
tariff plan when consumers are homogeneous and have a deterministic demand, and the
firm costs are independent on consumers’ usage level. In section 3 we allow the firm’s
costs to depend on consumers’ usage. In section 4 we analyze the case of heterogeneous
consumers, and in section 5, we show how the results can be extended to the case of
consumers with a stochastic demand. Section 6 concludes with a discussion. To streamline
the presentation, most proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Homogeneous consumers with a deterministic de-
mand
Consider a market with rational consumers whose valuation from talking x ≥ 0 minutes is
V (x) =
∫ x
0
v(y) dy, (1)
where v(x) is the consumer surplus valuation for the x minute. We assume that v(x) is
continuous, v(x) > 0 for 0 ≤ x < xmaxV and v(x) < 0 for x > xmaxV , where 0 < xmaxV < ∞.
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Therefore, V (x) is continuously differentiable, its global maximum is positive, finite, and
is attained at xmaxV , i.e.,
xmaxV := arg max
x≥0
V (x), V max := V (xmaxV ), 0 < x
max
V <∞, 0 < V max <∞. (2)
Thus, when unrestricted, a rational consumer will talk exactly xmaxV minutes.
The assumption that the consumer maximal valuation is attained at a finite xmaxV is
essential for the analysis. There are two possible approaches to justify this assumption:
1. Assumption (2) is satisfied by the quadratic valuation function V (x) = α1x − α2x2
that is common in the empirical literature on two- and three-part tariff pricing (see
for example Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007), Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2007),
Iyengar, Jedidi and Kohli (2008), Ascarza, Lambrecht and Vilcassim (2012)). Fur-
thermore, the assumption that the surplus valuation becomes negative above a fi-
nite xmaxV is consistent with empirical evidence that consumers with unlimited plans
speak well below 24 hours per day.
Nevertheless, this assumption on V (x) seemingly violates the conditions of mono-
tonicity and local non-satiation that are fundamental in microeconomic modeling of
consumer preferences (see e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green; 1995). While this
is true for a general valuation function, since the variable x is number of minutes
per period, say a day, the valuation function V contains an implicit constraint: a
limit X that the consumer has per period on the time available (e.g., 24 hours per
day). Moreover, if the consumer does not use all the available time for one activity
(talking over the phone), he or she has other uses for it. We thus posit the second
approach of achieving this condition:
2. Assume that the consumer has a finite budget constraint x ≤ X <∞, and that her
valuation when talking x minutes is V (x) =
∫ x
0
v1(y) dy+
∫ X−x
0
v2(y) dy, where v1(y)
and v2(y) are her surplus valuations from talking and from all the alternative usage
of her time, respectively. We then have the following result:
Lemma 1. Assume that v1(y) and v2(y) are positive and monotonically decreasing
in y. If v1(X) < v2(0) and v2(X) < v1(0), Then V (x) satisfies (2).
Proof. We have that V (x) =
∫ x
0
v1(y) dy +
∫ X
0
v2(y) dy −
∫ X
X−x
v2(y) dy = C2 +∫ x
0
v(y) dy, where C2 =
∫ X
0
v2(y) dy is a constant and v(y) = v1(y) − v2(X − y).
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Since v(0) > 0, v(X) < 0, and v′(x) = v′1(x) + v
′
2(X − x) < 0, there exists a unique
0 < xmaxV < X such that v(y) is positive for y < x
max
V and negative for y > x
max
V .
Consequently, maxV (x) is finite, and is attained a a finite x.
Note that, Lemma 1 provides a theoretical foundation for satiated utility functions
that are used in the empirical literature.
A monopolistic service provider (firm) offers a monthly plan (p, T, F ), such that if a
consumer signs up to the plan, she pays a fixed fee of F dollars (”access fee”) and in
return gets T minutes of free calls. For every minute in excess of T , the consumer pays an
additional price of p dollars per minute. Thus, the firm’s revenue from a consumer that
talks x minutes is
pi(x, p, T, F ) =
{
F, if x ≤ T,
F + p(x− T ), if x > T. (3)
We assume that when a consumer is charged p(x−T ) for exceeding his monthly allowance,
he may experience a “psychological cost”, which we denote by S(x, p, T ). Therefore,{
S(x, p, T ) = 0, if x ≤ T,
S(x, p, T ) ≥ 0, if x > T. (4)
This effect was not considered in previous studies of three-part tariff plans, but is consistent
with prospect theory. The consumer’s utility U(x, p, T, F ) is the difference between his
valuation of the service and his monetary and psychological costs, i.e.,
U(x, p, T, F ) = V (x)− pi(x, p, T, F )− S(x, p, T ). (5)
Therefore,
U(x, p, T, F ) =
{
V (x)− F, if x ≤ T,
V (x)− F − p(x− T )− S(x, p, T ), if x > T. (6)
For a given plan (p, T, F ), the optimal number of minutes for a consumer is
xoptU (p, T, F ) := argmax
x≥0
U(x, p, T, F ). (7)
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In this case, his utility is
Uopt(p, T, F ) := max
x≥0
U(x, p, T, F ) = U(xoptU (p, T, F ), p, T, F ). (8)
A rational consumer signs up to the plan (and talks xoptU minutes) if U
opt(p, T, F ) > 0, but
does not sign up to the plan if Uopt(p, T, F ) < 0. When Uopt(p, T, F ) = 0, the consumer is
”indifferent” between signing or not signing. In practice, the firm can always set a slightly
lower fixed fee, leading the consumer to signs up. Hence, from now on we assume that
if Uopt(p, T, F ) = 0, the consumer signs up to the plan.
When the firm offers a plan (p, T, F ), its revenue per (rational) consumer is
Π(p, T, F ) :=
{
pi(xoptU (p, T, F ), p, T, F ), if U
opt(p, T, F ) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
(9)
The firm optimization problem is to find the plan (popt, T opt, F opt) that maximizes its
profits:
(popt, T opt, F opt) = arg max
p,T,F≥0
Π(p, T, F ).
Note that in order to find the optimal firm plan, one first needs to calculate the op-
timal consumer response, see (7). This nested optimization problem is non-smooth, be-
cause U(x, p, T, F ) is not smooth at x = T . Therefore, it cannot be solved using the
first-order conditions, except in some very simple cases. This non-smooth nested optimiza-
tion problem can be solved explicitly using a different mathematical approach, leading
to
Proposition 1. The optimal firm plan is
F opt = V max, T opt ≥ xmaxV , popt ≥ 0, (10)
where V max and xmaxV are defined in (2). In addition,
1. The consumer talks xmaxV minutes, i.e., as much as she would in an unlimited plan.
2. The consumer utility is 0.
3. The firm revenue is V max.
Proof. This is a special case of Proposition 5.
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Thus, the optimal firm strategy is to let consumers talk as much as they want, so that
they would maximize their valuation. Therefore, it sets T opt ≥ xmaxV . Then, it extracts all
their utility through the fixed fee. Since the consumers do not exceed their allowance, the
value of popt is insignificant.
For future reference, we note the following result:
Lemma 2. There is no optimal strategy in which a portion of the firm revenues comes
from overage usage, i.e., there is no optimal strategy with F < V max and T < xmaxV .
Proof. Assume that there is an optimal strategy with F < V max. Then xmaxV > T and
p > 0, since otherwise the firm revenue will be F , which is suboptimal. When a consumer
exceeds T he incurs psychological costs that reduce his utility. Even if psychological costs
are neglected, since a rational consumer stop talking once V ′(x) ≤ p, he talks less than
xmaxV minutes. Therefore, his utility will be smaller than V
max. Since the overall payment
of the consumer cannot exceed his utility, the firm revenues will be smaller than V max.
3 Variable firm cost
In Proposition 1 we saw that the optimal firm strategy is to let consumers talk as much
as they want, and then extract all their utility using the fixed fee. This is no longer true,
however, when the firm cost depends on the number of minutes that consumers use, since
then above a certain usage level the consumers marginal utility becomes smaller than the
firm marginal cost.
To analyze this case, we denote by C(x) the firm cost when a consumer talks x minutes.
The firm revenue per consumer is the difference between its profits and costs, i.e.,
pic(x, p, T, F ) = pi(x, p, T, F )− C(x).
Thus,
pic(x, p, T, F ) =
{
F − C(x), if x ≤ T,
F − C(x) + p(x− T ), if x > T.
Consequently, the firm optimization problem reads
(popt, T opt, F opt) = arg max
p,T,F≥0
Πc(p, T, F ),
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where
Πc(p, T, F ) :=
{
pic(x
opt
U (p, T, F ), p, T, F ), if U
opt(p, T, F ) > 0,
0, otherwise,
and xoptU and U
opt are given by equations (7) and (8), respectively.
Proposition 2. Suppose that V (x) is concave, C(x) is monotonically increasing, and V (x)−
C(x) has a unique global maximum at
xmaxV,c := arg max
x≥0
{V (x)−C(x)}. (11)
Then the optimal firm plan is
F opt = V (xmaxV,c ), T
opt = xmaxV,c , p
opt ≥ pc,
where
pc := max
x≥xmax
V,c
{
V (x)− V (xmaxV,c )
x− xmaxV,c
}
(12)
is the minimal optimal overage price. In addition,
1. The consumer talks xmaxV,c minutes, where 0 < x
max
V,c < x
max
V .
2. The consumer utility is zero.
3. The firm revenue is V (xmaxV,c )−C(xmaxV,c ).
Proof. See web Appendix.
Thus, when the firm offers an unlimited plan (T = ∞), the maximal fixed fee that a
consumer who wants to talk x minutes is willing to pay is F = V (x). In this case, the firm’s
revenue is F − C(x) = V (x) − C(x). Therefore, from the firm perspective, the maximal
revenue is attained where the consumer talks xmaxV,c minutes, see (11). From the consumer
perspective, however, her maximal utility is attained when she talks xmaxV minutes, see (2).
Since xmaxV,c < x
max
V , the firm has to ”convince” the consumer to use exactly x
max
V,c minutes.
To do that, the firm sets T = xmaxV,c , so that the consumer pays no overage fee when she
uses x = xmaxV,c minutes, and pays an overage fee when she uses x > x
max
V,c . In addition,
the firm sets the minimal overage price pc so that for any x > x
max
V,c , the overage payment
will be greater than the additional valuation gained from exceeding xmaxV,c , i.e., so that
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p(x − xmaxV,c ) > V (x) − V (xmaxV,c ). This guarantees that consumers will not benefit from
exceeding xmaxV,c .
If V (x) is concave, then by (12), the mean value theorem, and the concavity of V (x),
pc = V
′(xmaxV,c ). (13)
In other words, p should be greater than the marginal valuation at xmaxV,c . In particular,
if C(x) = cx, then by (11) and (13),
pc = V
′(xmaxV,c ) = C
′(xmaxV,c ) = c. (14)
We recall that when the firm costs are negligible, the firm only uses one out of three
levers possible under the three-part tariff contract. Thus, the contract is effectively reduced
to a fixed-price contract where consumers can use as many minutes as they desire. In
contrast, in the case of variable firm costs, the firm uses all three levers: The fixed fee F ,
the number of free minutes T , and a sufficiently large overage price p. Note that even when
the firm incurs variable costs, it still extracts all of the consumers utility via the fixed fee.
3.1 Parametric example
The quadratic valuation function
V (x) := α1x− α2x2 (15)
is common in the three-part tariff literature. The maximum of V (x) is attained at xmaxV =
α1
2α2
and is given by V max := V (xmaxV ) =
α2
1
4α2
. We use the values α1 = 37·10−2 dollars/minute
and α2 = 4.14 · 10−4 dollars/minute2, which were estimated by Iyengar et al. (2008) from
a conjoint study.
We begin with the case of constant firm costs. By Proposition 1, the optimal firm plan
is
F opt =
α21
4α2
= $83, T opt ≥ α1
2α2
= 447 minutes, popt ≥ 0.
Hence, the optimal firm revenue is Π(popt, T opt, F opt) = F opt = $83.
To include variable firm costs, we consider a linear cost function C(x) = cx. It is easy
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to check that
xmaxV,c = argmax{α1x− α2x2 − cx} =
α1 − c
2α2
= 447− 1208c.
Therefore, V (xmaxV,c ) =
α2
1
−c2
4α2
= 83 − 604c2. In addition, by (14), pc = c. Therefore, by
Proposition 2, the optimal firm plan is
F opt = $(83 − 604c2), T opt = (447− 1208c) minutes, popt ≥ c, (16)
and the income derived from the optimal firm plan is
Π(popt, T opt, F opt) = F opt− cxmaxV,c =
(α1 − c)2
4α2
= $(
√
83−
√
604c)2.
As expected, the firm revenue decreases with c.
4 Heterogeneous consumers
To analyze the effect of consumers heterogeneity, we consider a market that consists of
nL light users with utility UL = VL−pi−SL and nH heavy users with utilityUH = VH−pi−SH.
We assume that in an unlimited plan (T = ∞), heavy users want to use more minutes
than the light ones, i.e.,
xmaxV,L < x
max
V,H , (17)
where xmaxV,i = argmaxx≥0 Vi(x) and i = L,H. We also assume that the maximal valuation
of the light users is smaller than that of the heavy ones, i.e.,
V maxL < V
max
H , (18)
where V maxi = Vi(x
max
V,i ) = maxx≥0 Vi(x). The psychological cost of the light and heavy
users satisfy (4). In addition, we assume that the psychological cost of the heavy users is
of the form
SH(x, p, T ) =
∫ x
T
sH(y, p) dy, x ≥ T, (19)
and that the marginal psychological cost sH is positive, independent of T and F , and
satisfies limp→0 sH(y, p) = 0.
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4.1 Optimal single plan
The optimal plan (popt, T opt, F opt) is the one which maximizes the average firm revenue
per consumer
Π(p, T, F ) = γHΠH(p, T, F ) + (1− γH)ΠL(p, T, F ),
where γH =
nH
nL+nH
is the fraction of heavy users, ΠH(p, T, F ) is defined by (9) with U
opt =
UoptH = maxx≥0 UH and x
opt
U = x
opt
U,H := arg maxx≥0 UH, and similarly for ΠL(p, T, F ).
Lemma 3. There is no three-part tariff plan that extracts the maximal revenues from both
light and heavy users. In other words, for any plan (p, T, F ),
Π(p, T, F ) < γHV
max
H + (1− γH)V maxL .
Proof. The only way to extract the maximal revenue from each segment is through the
fixed fee (Lemma 2). Since V maxL < V
max
H , however, this is not possible.
One possible firm strategy is to focus on the heavy users:
Lemma 4. The optimal firm plan that maximizes revenue from heavy users is to allow
them to talk as much as they want, and then extract all of their utility through the fixed
fee, i.e.,
F optH = V
max
H , T
opt
H ≥ xmaxV,H , poptH ≥ 0.
In this case,
1. Heavy users sign up to the plan and use xmaxV,H minutes (i.e., as much as they would
in an unlimited plan). Their utility is zero.
2. Light users do not sign up to the plan.
3. The firm revenue per consumer is
ΠH−only := Π(p
opt
H , T
opt
H , F
opt
H ) = γHV
max
H . (20)
Proof. The optimal firm strategy follows from Proposition 1. Since V maxL < V
max
H = F
opt
H ,
light users will not sign up to the plan.
Another possible firm strategy is to focus on the light users:
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Lemma 5. The optimal firm plan that maximizes revenue from light users is to allow
them to talk as much as they want, extract all their utility through the fixed fee, and then
maximize the revenue from the heavy users by a proper choice of p and T , i.e.,
F optL = V
max
L , T
opt
L = x
max
V,L , p
opt
L = argmax
p≥0
{p(x˜optU,H(p)− xmaxV,L )} > 0, (21)
where x˜optU,H(p) = argmaxx≥0 UH(x, p, T
opt
L , F
opt
L ). In this case,
1. Light users sign up to the plan and use xmaxV,L minutes (i.e., as much as they would in
an unlimited plan). Their utility is zero.
2. Heavy users sign up to the plan and use xoptU,H = argmaxx≥0 UH(x, p
opt
L , T
opt
L , F
opt
L )
minutes, where xmaxV,L < x
opt
U,H < x
max
V,H . Thus, they pay for overage usage, and do not
use as many minutes as they would in an unlimited plan. Their utility is positive.
3. The firm revenue per consumer is
ΠL−mainly := Π(p
opt
L , T
opt
L , F
opt
L ) = V
max
L + γHp
opt
L (x
opt
U,H − xmaxV,L ). (22)
In particular, ΠL−mainly > V
max
L .
Proof. See web Appendix.
Thus, the firm maximizes its profits from the light users by setting T to be at least the
number of minutes they want to talk, and extracting all their utility through the fixed fee.
Unlike the optimal plan for homogeneous light users (Proposition 1), however, the firm
sets p and T not only to maximize its revenues from the light users, but also to maximize
its revenues from heavy users. Hence, the firm sets T to be equal to the number of minutes
that light users want to talk, since a larger T will allow the heavy users to talk more
minutes without paying for them. In addition, p cannot be any positive price, because it
should the maximize revenue from heavy users.
The firm’s revenue thus consists of the fixed fee V maxL that both light and heavy users
pay, and the overage payment poptL (x
opt
U,H − xmaxV,L ) of the heavy users for exceeding T . Note
that the firm fails to extract all of the surplus from heavy users, who are thus subsidized
by the light users.
A priori, one might think that when they are “few” heavy users, the optimal plan is
given by (21). We now show, however, that maximizing the revenues from the light users
is never an optimal strategy:
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Proposition 3. Any optimal plan (popt, T opt, F opt) that targets both heavy and light users
satisfies F opt < V maxL and T
opt < xmaxV,L . Hence, plan (21) cannot be optimal.
Proof. Since light users sign up to the plan, F opt ≤ V maxL . Assume by negation that F opt =
V maxL . In that case, the optimal plan is given by Lemma 5. In particular, T
opt = xmaxV,L .
To show that this plan is not optimal, we now show that the firm revenues increase if T
and F decrease to T− := xmaxV,L −∆T and F− := VL(xmaxV,L −∆T ), respectively, for ∆T  1
sufficiently small.
Under plan (popt, T−, F−), if the light users will use x = xmaxV,L −∆T , their utility will be
UL(x = x
max
V,L −∆T, popt, T−, F−) = VL(xmaxV,L −∆T )−F− = 0. Hence, they will sign up to the
plan. Regardless of whether they talk more than xmaxV,L −∆T , the firm revenue from them
will be at least F+. Hence, ΠL(p
opt, T−, F−) ≥ VL(xmaxV,L −∆T ). Since xmaxV,L = argmaxVL(x),
then V ′L(x
max
V,L ) = 0 and V
′′
L (x
max
V,L ) < 0. Therefore,
V maxL − F− = VL(xmaxV,L )− VL(xmaxV,L −∆T ) ∼ −
V ′′L (x
max
V,L )
2
(∆T )2.
Hence, the decrease of the firm revenue from a light user due to the changes in F and T
is O((∆T )2).
The heavy users will still sign up to the plan, since their utility is positive. In addition,
as in the proof of Lemma 5, the change in T and F does not affect the number of minutes
they use. Therefore, the firm revenue from overage usage by the heavy users will increase
by p∆T . Since the firm revenue decrease by O((∆T )2) and increase by O(∆T ), for ∆T
sufficiently small the net firm revenue will increase. See also Section 4.2 for an example.
The choice between targeting only the heavy users versus targeting all users depends on
the firm revenue under each strategy. Since the revenues under the (suboptimal) plan (21)
are at least V maxL , the firm should target all users when γHV
max
H < V
max
L . When γHV
max
H 
V maxL , however, the firm should target the heavy users exclusively.
4.2 Parametric example
Consider a market that consists of nH heavy users and nL light users with valuations
VH(x) := α1x− α2x2, VL(x) := λα1x− α2x2, (23)
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respectively, where 0 < λ < 1 captures the reduction in light users’ valuation, compared
to heavy users valuation.
1. If the firm focuses on the heavy users (Lemma 4) then, as in section 3.1,
ΠH−only = γHV
max
H = γH
α21
4α2
. (24)
2. If the firm focuses on the light users (Lemma 5) then, as in section 3.1,
F optL = V
max
L =
λ2α21
4α2
, T optL = x
max
L,V =
λα1
2α2
. (25)
The overage price is computed from
poptL
(21)
= argmax
p≥0
ΠH(p, T
opt
L , F
opt
L )
(6)
= argmax
p>0
{p(xoptU,H − T optL )}. (26)
In order to proceed, we need to compute xoptU,H, the number of minutes that heavy
users consume when they exceed T . For simplicity, we assume that psychological
costs are negligible. Then by (6) and (23), U ′H(x) = V
′
H(x)− p = α1 − 2α2x− p and
U ′′H(x) = −2α2 < 0. Therefore,
xoptU,H =
α1 − p
2α2
. (27)
Substituting (25) and (27) in (26) yields
poptL =
α1(1− λ)
2
. (28)
Based on (22), (25), (27), and (28), the optimal revenue per consumer is
ΠL−mainly = V
max
L + γHp
opt
L (x
opt
U,H − T optL ) (29)
=
λ2α21
4α2
+ γH
α1(1− λ)
2
(
α1 + λα1
4α2
− λα1
2α2
)
=
α21
4α2
(
λ2 + γH
(1− λ)2
2
)
.
If λ is close to 1, light and heavy users are almost identical. Therefore, the optimal
strategy is to offer a plan that targets both segments. If λ is close to 0, heavy users are
much more valuable to the firm. Hence, the firm should offer a plan that targets only
heavy users. To find the threshold value of λ at which the optimal strategy changes, let λ∗
17
be such that ΠL−mainly = ΠH−only. By (24) and (29), ΠL−mainly = ΠH−only
(
λ2
γH
+ (1−λ)
2
2
)
.
Therefore,
λ∗ =
γH +
√
2γ2H + 2γH
2 + γH
. (30)
Consequently,
1. If λ < λ∗, ΠL−mainly < ΠH−only and so the firm is better off targeting only the heavy
users segment.
2. If λ > λ∗, ΠL−mainly > ΠH−only and so the firm is better off targeting mainly the light
consumers segment, i.e., selling to both segments while extracting all profits from the
light users segment.
As noted, allowing light users to talk as much as they want is always a suboptimal
strategy. We now compute the optimal plan when the firm targets both light and heavy
users. By Proposition 3, the optimal plan is attained for some T < xmaxV,L . Since it is always
better to extract money from consumers using the fixed fee, the firm should set F = VL(T ).
In this case, light users pay VL(T ) and heavy users pay VL(T )+p(x
opt
U,H(p)−T ), where xoptU,H
is given by (27). Therefore, the firm revenue is
ΠL+H = VL(T ) + γHp(x
opt
U,H − T ).
To compute the optimal p and T , we differentiate ΠL+H with respect to p and T . This
yields
∂ΠL+H
∂T
= V ′L(T )− γHp = 0,
∂ΠL+H
∂p
= (xoptU,H(p)− T ) + p
d
dp
xoptU,H(p) = 0.
Substituting (23) and (27) yields
p =
V ′L(T )
γH
=
1
γH
(λα1 − 2α2T ), T = xoptU,H + p
d
dp
xoptU,H =
α1 − 2p
2α2
.
The solution of these linear equations is
T opt =
λα1
2α2
(
1− γH
2− γH
1− λ
λ
)
, popt =
1− λ
2− γHα1. (31)
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policy I policy II
fixed fee (F ) $22 $21
usage allowance (T ) 228 minutes 191 minutes
overage price (p) 9 cents/minute 11 cents/minute
usage of light consumers (xoptU,L) 228 minutes 191 minutes
usage of heavy consumers (xoptU,H) 337 minutes 319 minutes
firm revenue per consumer ΠL−mainly = $24.3 ΠL+H = $24.8
Table 1: Comparison of two policies that target both light and heavy users.
Note that
T opt = T optL
(
1− γH
2− γH
1− λ
λ
)
< xmaxV,L , p
opt = poptL
2
2− γH > p
opt
L .
Thus, as predicted in Proposition 3, the optimal plan that targets both heavy and light
users satisfies T opt < xmaxV,L . The decrease in the firm revenues from the fixed fee is offset by
the increase in the overage price, since popt > poptL . Finally, some additional manipulations
show that the optimal revenue per consumer is
ΠL+H = VL(T
opt) + γHp
opt(xoptU,H − T opt) =
α21
4α2
2λ2 − 2λγH + γH
2− γH = ΠH−only
2λ2 − 2λγH + γH
γH(2− γH) .
We use the values of α1 and α2 from Section 3.1. In addition, we use λ = 0.51,
nH = 50, 000 and nL = 125, 000. Thus, γH = 50/175 ≈ 0.286 and λ∗ = 0.5, see (30). Since
λ > λ∗, the firm is better off targeting both light and heavy consumers.
Table 1 presents the two potential policies that target all consumers. Under policy
I which was analyzed in Lemma 5, the firm extracts all the surplus from the light users
setting the allowance to be exactly the number of minutes they wish to talk (228 minutes).
Therefore, the light users use 228 minutes and do not pay any overage fee. The firm sets
a fixed fee of $22, which is equal to the valuation of the light consumers when talking
228 minutes. To maximize the revenue from the heavy users, the firm sets an overage
price of 9 cents per-minute. The heavy users use 339 minutes, out of which 228 are
free and 339 − 228 = 109 are being charged for. Hence, they pay an overage fee of
p(x− T ) = 0.09 · 109 = $9.81. Overall, the firm revenue per consumer is $24.3.
Policy II is the optimal policy that targets all consumers, which was calculated earlier
in this subsection. Thus, p and T are given by (31). Under this policy the firm offers less
free minutes (T = 191). The profits from the light users are lower, since they now use 191
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minutes, and so their valuation is lower. Since they still do not pay any overage fee, the
fixed fee reduces to F = VL(T ) = $21. While the heavy users also use less minutes than in
policy I (319 instead of 337), the pay for more minutes, since 319-191 = 128. In addition,
they pay 2 cents per minute more for exceeding their monthly allowance. Overall, their
overage fee increases dramatically to p(x − T ) = 0.11 · 128 = $14.08. Overall, the firm
revenue per consumer is $24.8. The difference between the profit under the two policies is
close to 2%. While it might not look that large, this 2% are net addition to the firm profit,
since they do not increase the firm costs.
4.3 Optimal two plans
The firm can try to further increase its revenues by offering two three-part tariff plans (p1, T1, F1)
and (p2, T2, F2) that target the light and heavy consumers, respectively. Since consumers
choose the plan that maximizes their utility, the heavy consumers choose the plan
(pH, TH, FH) :=


(p1, T1, F1), if U
opt
H (p1, T1, F1) > max{UoptH (p2, T2, F2), 0},
(p2, T2, F2), if U
opt
H (p2, T2, F2) > max{UoptH (p1, T1, F1), 0},
do not sign up, otherwise,
(32)
where UoptH is defined by (8) with U = UH. Similarly, the light consumers choose the
plan (pL, TL, FL). The firm revenues from heavy and light users are nHΠ
opt
H (pH, TH, FH) and
nLΠ
opt
L (pL, TL, FL), respectively. Hence, the firm optimization problem reads{
(popt1 , T
opt
1 , F
opt
1 ), (p
opt
2 , T
opt
2 , F
opt
2 )
}
= argmaxΠtwo plans(p1, T1, F1, p2, T2, F2),
where Πtwo plans = γHΠ
opt
H (pH, TH, FH)+(1−γH)ΠoptL (pL, TL, FL) is the average firm revenue
per consumer.
Ideally, the firm would like to extract the maximal revenue from all consumers, i.e.,
γHV
max
H from the heavy consumers and (1− γH)V maxL from the light ones. In Lemma 3 we
showed that this is not possible with a single plan. Whether this is possible with two plans
depends on the valuation of the heavy users at the optimal usage level of the light users:
Proposition 4. Two three-part tariff plans can extract the maximal revenues from both
light and heavy users if and only if VH(x
max
V,L ) ≤ VL(xmaxV,L ), i.e., if the heavy users have
a negative utility when joining the optimal plan of the light users. In other words, if
VH(x
max
V,L ) > VL(x
max
V,L ), then for any two plans (p1, T1, F1) and (p2, T2, F2), the average firm
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revenue per consumer satisfies
Πtwo plans < γHV
max
H + (1− γH)V maxL .
Proof. See web Appendix.
In general, one would expect that VH(x
max
V,L ) > VL(x
max
V,L ). This, however, is not always
the case. For example, a residential light user might value a few megabites of internet,
while a heavy user might have no value for the internet unless it can be used for business.
In Lemma 4 we saw that if the firm insists on maximizing the revenue from the heavy
users, the light consumers will not sign up to this plan. If the firm adds a second plan but
makes sure that it would be unattractive to the heavy users, the light users will not sign
up to the second plan if and only if the valuation of the heavy users is always larger than
that of the light ones:
Lemma 6. There are no two plans (p1, T1, F1) and (p2, T2, F2) that extract the maximal
revenue from the heavy consumers and also extract some revenues from the light consumers,
if and only if
VL(x) < VH(x), x ≥ 0. (33)
Proof. See web Appendix.
Thus, if the firm wants to attract the light users, it has to give up some of the potential
revenues from the heavy ones. We note that Proposition 4 and Lemma 6 remain valid if
we increase the number of plans. For example, assume that there are three segments of
consumers: light, medium, and heavy. Then with three three-part tariff plans, the firm can
extract the maximal revenues from the light, medium, and heavy users, if and only if the
medium users have a negative utility when joining the optimal plan of the light users, and
the heavy users have a negative utility when joining the optimal plans of the light users or
of the medium users.
In Lemma 5 we saw that if the firm offers a single plan that extracts the maximal
revenue from the light consumers, it can increase its revenues by maximizing the overage
charges from the heavy consumers with an optimal choice of p and T . In that case, the
firm profit was denoted by ΠL−mainly. We now show that the firm can further increase its
profits by adding a second plan for the heavy users:
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Lemma 7. Let V ′′H (x) < 0. Then out of all the two plans (p1, T1, F1) and (p2, T2, F2) which
maximize the revenues from the light users, the ones that maximize the overall profits are
F1 = V
max
L , T1 = x
max
V,L , p1 ≥ V ′H(xmaxV,L ) (34a)
for the light users, and
F2 = V
max
H − (VH(xmaxV,L )− V maxL ), T2 ≥ xmaxV,H , p2 ≥ 0 (34b)
for the heavy ones. In this case,
1. Light users sign up to the plan and use xmaxV,L minutes (i.e., as many minutes as they
would in an unlimited plan). Their utility is zero.
2. Heavy users sign up to the plan and use xmaxV,H minutes, (i.e., as many minutes as
they would in an unlimited plan). They do not pay for overage usage. Their utility
is positive.
3. The firm revenue per consumer is
Πtwo plans = V
max
L + γH
(
V maxH − VH(xmaxV,L )
)
.
In particular, it is higher than when the firm offers a single plan that extracts the max-
imal revenue from the light consumers, i.e., Πtwo plans > ΠL−mainly, where ΠL−mainly
is given by (22).
Proof. See web Appendix.
While adding a second plan for the heavy users increases the firm revenue, maximizing
the revenue from the light users remains a suboptimal strategy:
Lemma 8. Any optimal two plans (popt1 , T
opt
1 , F
opt
1 ) and (p
opt
2 , T
opt
2 , F
opt
2 ) that target the
light and heavy users, respectively, satisfy F opt1 < V
max
L and T
opt
1 < x
max
V,L . Hence, the two
plans given by (34) cannot be optimal.
Indeed, if we set T opt1 = x
max
V,L −∆T where 0 < ∆T  1, the revenue loss from the light
users is quadratic in ∆T , since their utility is maximized at xmaxV,L . The additional revenue
gain from the heavy users, however, is linear in ∆T . Therefore, the net revenue increases
as T decreases from xmaxV,L . See Appendix F for further details.
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5 Stochastic demand
In practice, consumers cannot predict exactly how many minutes they will use. This is
especially true in the United States where consumers pay for incoming calls, which are
harder to predict and control. Therefore, when a consumer plans to talk x minutes, he
ends up talking Xx minutes, where Xx is a random variable. The randomness of Xx can
be additive (i.e., Xx = x + Z1), multiplicative (i.e., Xx = x(1 + Z2)) or both (i.e., Xx =
x(1+Z1)+Z2), where Z1 and Z2 are random variables. To allow for all of these possibilities,
we assume that for any x, Xx is a random variable that attains its value in [0,M(x)] with
probability 1, where 0 ≤ M(x) <∞.1 We also denote the density distribution of Xx by gx.
We assume that both the consumer and the firm know the distribution of Xx.
The expected firm revenue where the consumer plans to talk x minutes is
p¯i(x, p, T, F ) := E[pi(Xx, p, T, F )] =
∫ M (x)
0
pi(y, p, T, F ) gx(y) dy,
where pi is defined by (3). Therefore,
p¯i(x, p, T, F ) =
{
F, if M(x) ≤ T,
F + p
∫ M (x)
T
(y − T )gx(y) dy, if M(x) > T.
(35)
The consumer expected valuation where he plans to talk x minutes is
V¯ (x) := E[V (Xx)] =
∫ M (x)
0
V (y) gx(y) dy, (36)
where V is defined by (1). We denote by V¯ max the maximum of V¯ (x) and by xmax
V¯
the
number of minutes that maximizes V¯ (x), i.e.,
xmaxV¯ = argmaxx≥0
V¯ (x), V¯ max = V¯ (xmaxV¯ ). (37)
Thus, xmax
V¯
is the number of minutes that a rational stochastic consumer plans to talk
when he signs up to an unlimited plan (T =∞).
1The assumption that the demand shock is bounded follows from our assumption that the consumer
has a finite budget (Section 2).
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The consumer expected psychological cost is
S¯(x, p, T ) := E[S(Xx, p, T )] =
{
0, if M(x) ≤ T,∫M (x)
T
S(y, p, T ) gx(y) dy, if M(x) > T,
where S is defined by (4). The consumer expected utility when he plans to talk x minutes
is
U¯(x, p, T, F ) := E[U(Xx, p, T, F )]
(5)
= V¯ (x)− p¯i(x, p, T, F )− S¯(x, p, T ). (38)
For a given plan (p, T, F ), a rational consumer plans to talk xopt
U¯
minutes, where
xopt
U¯
(p, T, F ) := argmax
x≥0
U¯ (x, p, T, F ). (39)
The consumer signs up to the plan if his maximal expected utility is non-negative, i.e,
U¯opt(p, T, F ) := U¯ (xopt
U¯
(p, T, F ), p, T, F ) ≥ 0. (40)
Otherwise, he does not sign up to the plan. Therefore, the firm expected revenue is
Π¯(p, T, F ) :=
{
p¯i
(
xopt
U¯
(p, T, F ), p, T, F
)
, if U¯opt(p, T, F ) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
(41)
In the case of constant firm costs, the firm optimization problem reads
(popt, T opt, F opt) = arg max
p,T,F≥0
Π¯(p, T, F ).
The following proposition characterizes the optimal three-part-tariff when the demand is
stochastic:
Proposition 5. The optimal firm plan when consumers are homogeneous, firm costs are
constant, and consumers have stochastic demand is
F opt = V¯ max, T opt ≥ M(xmaxV¯ ), popt ≥ 0, (42)
where V¯ max and xmax
V¯
are defined in (37). In addition,
1. The consumer plans to talk xmax
V¯
minutes.
2. The consumer expected utility is 0.
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3. The expected firm revenue is V¯ max.
Proof. Because the optimization problem is non-smooth, and because we do not assume
explicit forms for V, S, and Xx, it cannot be solved using the first-order condition approach.
Therefore, we solve the optimization problem by obtaining an upper bound on the firm
revenue under any three-part plan, see equation (43), and then showing that plan (42)
attains this bound. We first show that the expected firm revenue is bounded by the
maximal expected consumer valuation, i.e.,
Π¯(p, T, F ) ≤ V¯ max. (43)
Indeed, for any firm plan (p, T, F ) such that the maximal utility of the consumer U¯opt(p, T, F )
is negative, the consumer does not sign up to the plan. Therefore, the firm’s revenue is
zero. In particular, Π¯(p, T, F ) = 0 < V¯ max.
If U¯opt(p, T, F ) ≥ 0, the consumer signs up to the plan. Hence, by (4), (37), and (38),
0 ≤ U¯opt(p, T, F ) = V¯ (xopt
U¯
)− Π¯(p, T, F )− S¯(xopt
U¯
) < V¯ max − Π¯(p, T, F ). (44)
We now show that if the firm plan satisfies (42), then Π¯(popt, T opt, F opt) = V¯ max. Indeed,
for any T opt ≥M(xmax
V¯
), if a consumer signs up to the plan, he will plan to use xmax
V¯
minutes.
By (6), his utility is U¯ (xmax
V¯
, popt, T opt, F opt) = V¯ max − F opt = 0. Therefore, he chooses to
sign up to the plan. In this case, the firm revenue is p¯i(xmax
V¯
, popt, T opt, F opt) = F opt =
V¯ max.
Thus, as in the deterministic case (Proposition 1), the solution of this non-smooth
optimization problem is to let consumers talk as much as they want, and then extract all
their utility through the fixed fee. Similarly, the result of Proposition 2 for homogeneous
consumers with variable firm costs, extends almost “as is” to the case of stochastic demand
(see Proposition 7 in the web Appendix). The results for heterogeneous consumers also
extend to the stochastic case almost “as is”. In that case, we assume that for any x, Xx,H
and Xx,L are random variables that attain their values with probability 1 in [0,MH(x)]
and [0,ML(x)], respectively. For example, the following Lemma shows the extension of
Lemma 7 to the case of stochastic demand:
Lemma 9. Let V¯ ′′H (x) < 0. Then out of all the two plans (p1, T1, F1) and (p2, T2, F2) which
maximize the revenues from the stochastic light users, the ones that maximize the overall
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profits are
F1 = V¯
max
L , T1 =ML(x
max
V¯,L ), p1 ≥ V¯ ′H(xmaxV¯,L ) (45a)
for the stochastic light users, and
F2 = V¯
max
H − (V¯H(xmaxV¯,L )− V¯ maxL ), T2 ≥MH(xmaxV¯,H), p2 ≥ 0 (45b)
for the stochastic heavy users.
The proof is identical to the deterministic case, with the obvious changes V → V¯ ,
xmaxV,L → xmaxV¯,L , UoptH → U¯optH , etc.
Similarly, the extension of Lemma 8 to the stochastic case reads as follows:
Lemma 10. Any optimal two plans (popt1 , T
opt
1 , F
opt
1 ) and (p
opt
2 , T
opt
2 , F
opt
2 ) that target the
stochastic light and heavy users, respectively, satisfy F opt1 < V¯
max
L and T
opt
1 < x
max
V¯,L
. Hence,
the two plans given by (45) cannot be optimal.
5.1 Stochastic influence
In this section we discuss how the firm’s optimal revenue is affected by the stochastic
demand Xx. We first compare consumers with stochastic and deterministic demand:
Lemma 11. The maximal expected valuation of consumers with stochastic demand is al-
ways less than that of consumers with deterministic demand (V¯ max < V max). Therefore,
the optimal firm’s revenue from consumers with deterministic demand is greater than from
consumers with stochastic demand (Π¯ < Π).
In general, as the variance of the consumer’s monthly usage increases, his expected
utility decreases. Therefore, the firm’s optimal revenue also decreases. We next prove this
result for the case of additive randomness.
Proposition 6. Suppose that V ′′ < 0, let the stochastic demand be given by Xwx = x+wZ,
where Z is a bounded random variable, and denote by Π¯(w) the corresponding optimal firm
revenue. Then Π¯(w) decreases as w increases.
5.2 Parametric example
We extend the parametric example from section 3.1 to the case of homogeneous consumers
with stochastic demand. Let Xx = x + Z, where Z is a bounded random variable with
26
zero mean and a variance of σ2. By Proposition 5, the optimal firm plan is
F opt = V¯ (xmaxV¯ ), T
opt ≥ xmaxV¯ +maxZ, popt ≥ 0,
and the maximal expected firm revenue is
Π¯(popt, T opt, F opt) = F opt = V¯ (xmaxV¯ ).
Since E[Z] = 0 and E[Z2] = σ2, the expected consumer valuation is, see (15),
V¯ (x) = E[V (x+ Z)] = α1(x+ E[Z])− α2(x2 + 2xE[Z] + E[Z2]) = V (x)− α2σ2. (46)
Since α2σ
2 does not depend on x, then x¯maxV = x
max
V , and so
V¯ (x¯maxV ) = V (x
max
V )− α2σ2 = $(83− α2σ2).
Therefore,
F = $(83 − α2σ2), T ≥ (447 + maxZ) minutes, p ≥ 0.
and
Π¯(p, T, F ) = $(83− α2σ2).
In particular, the firm revenue decreases with σ2, in agreement with Proposition 6.
6 Conclusions
Services play an ever larger role in the modern economy. Nonlinear pricing plans are
ubiquitous in the service industry, primarily as three-part tariff plans. Nevertheless, prior
research on three-part tariffs was limited, because the standard mathematical approach
(which is based on first-order conditions) is not suitable for this non-smooth nested opti-
mization problem. To overcome this obstacle, we adopted an alternative approach which
is based on finding tight bounds. This novel approach allows us to explicitly calculate the
optimal three-part tariff contract under general conditions. Our approach may be suitable
to other optimization problems in marketing and management, since many of these prob-
lems are inherently non-smooth (because, e.g., of the different response of consumers to
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“gains” and “losses”, or the existence of a threshold price).
When consumers are homogeneous and the firm costs are constant, the optimal three-
part tariff plan is to allow consumers to use as many minutes as they want, and extract
all their surplus through the fixed fee. In that case, the monthly allowance only needs to
be “sufficiently high”, and the value of the per-minute overage price can be arbitrary. In
practice, however, cellular firms often offer plans with a limited number of minutes, and
consumers often pay for exceeding their monthly allowance. Our analysis reveals that firms
may adopt this strategy when its costs depends on the usage level and/or when consumers
are heterogeneous. In the latter case, the firm should use all three levers of the tariff plan
(fixed fees, unit allowances, and overage fees) to discriminate among consumer segments.
When the market consists of two segments of light and heavy users, then depending
on the relative size of each segment and its attractiveness in terms of potential revenue,
the firm may either serve the heavy users exclusively, or serve both segments. In the
latter case, one could expect that the optimal firm policy would be to extract the maximal
surplus from the light users (by allowing them to use as many minutes as they want),
and then set the overage price so as to maximize the profits from the heavy users. This
strategy, however, turns out to be always suboptimal. Rather, the optimal policy is to
a lower monthly allowance, a lower monthly fixed fee, and a higher overage price. Thus,
the reduction of the monthly allowance reduces the revenues from the light users, since
they are willing to pay a lower fixed fee. This reduction is more than compensated by the
increase in the overage charges paid by the heavy users, who pay for more minutes and
pay more for each minute. Interestingly, under both policies, the light users subsidize the
heavy users, in the sense that the firm extracts all of the surplus from the light users, while
leaving a positive surplus to the heavy users.
In closing, we acknowledge that our analysis considers a monopoly service provider
who sells to a market that consists of at most two segments of consumers that are risk
neutral. The focus of this study is on computing and characterizing the optimal three-
part-tariff contract under different considerations (variable firm’s costs, heterogeneous or
homogeneous consumers, deterministic or stochastic demand, one or two three-part tariff
plans). There are several important issues that remain open. The most obvious one is
to allow for competition. Another interesting research avenue to consider is more general
multi-part tariff plans. For example, water and electricity are often priced using four-
part tariff plans in which consumers pay a fixed monthly fee F , a price p1 for each unit
consumed below a threshold T , and a (higher or lower) price p2 for each unit above T .
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Briefly, whenever the optimal three-part tariff plan in our model extracts maximum utility
from consumers (e.g., in the homogeneous case with or without firm costs and in the
heterogeneous case when the firm targets the heavy users), adding levers will, at best,
match (and might reduce) the profit. Therefore, for example, an optimal four-part tariff
plan for homogeneous consumers is one in which p1 = 0. Furthermore, even when the
optimal three-part tariff plan does not extract maximum utility from consumers, adding
levers is not always profitable. For example, consider the optimal three-part tariff plan that
targets light and heavy users, see Proposition 3. Charging price p1 for each unit below T
will not increase the firm’s profit since the additional revenue (p1T ) must be offset by an
identical reduction in the fixed fee. Adding levers can increase the firms profit when there
are more than two types of heterogeneous consumers.
Another assumption that can be challenged concerns the psychological costs. While we
allowed for a general psychological cost function associated with overage, we did not take
into account the psychological costs associated with leaving minutes on the table (underage).
In the deterministic case, allowing for psychological underage costs has a limited effect
on our results. Indeed, in most of our results, consumers use their allowance (see, e.g.,
Proposition 2 and Lemma 5). In such cases, allowing for underage costs does not change
the results. Consumers may experience underage costs in cases such as Proposition 1,
where the optimal firm strategy is T opt ≥ xmaxV . In such cases, the effect of introducing
underage costs is to change the optimal strategy to T opt = xmaxV . In the stochastic case,
the situation is more subtle. Briefly, including underage costs will result in lower expected
utility for a given plan, as consumers incur psychological costs if the realized consumption
is below the plan’s free minutes T . As a result, the firm will offer plans with a lower T .2
We leave all these open questions for future research.
Finally, we acknowledge that our analysis suggests that in most cases, consumers do not
(choose to) exceed their monthly allowance, which is inconsistent with evidence generated
by some of the empirical literature (Lambrecht, Seim and Skiera (2007), Iyengar, Ansari
and Gupta (2007), and Grubb (2009)) that consumers use more minutes than the number
of minutes included in their monthly plan. For example, Grubb (2009) states in figure 2
that this happens about 17% of the time. One reason for such inconsistency may be that
not all consumers are strategic as we assume in our model and analysis. Relaxing this
2The consumers utility function has some commonality with the (producer/retailer) newsvendor prob-
lem. Under the newsvendor problem, a firm that has to produce (order) units and faces uncertain demand
has to take into account the costs of selling less than the produced quantity (underage costs) or demand
that exceeds the produced quantity (overage).
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assumption may lead for results which will be more consistent with the empirical evidence.
We also note that our analysis suggests that if the firm targets the low users, then strategic
heavy users will exceed their monthly allowance (Lemma 5).
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A Proof of Propositions 2 and 7
In this section we formulate and solve the optimization problem when the firm incurs vari-
able costs C(x) and consumers have stochastic demands. The deterministic case (Propo-
sition 2) is the special case when Xx ≡ x. The expected firm revenue is
p¯ic(x, p, T, F ) = E[pi(Xx, p, T, F )−C(Xx)] =
{
F − C¯(x), if M(x) ≤ T,
F − C¯(x) + p ∫ M (x)
T
(y − T ) gx(y) dy, if M(x) > T,
where C¯(x) := E[C(Xx)]. Consequently, the firm optimization problem is (p
opt, T opt, F opt) =
argmaxp,T,F≥0 Π¯c(p, T, F ), where
Π¯c(p, T, F ) :=
{
pic(x
opt
U¯
(p, T, F ), p, T, F ), if U¯opt(p, T, F ) > 0,
0, otherwise.
Proposition 7. Suppose that V¯ (x)− C¯(x) has a unique global maximum which is attained
at
xmaxV¯,c := arg max
x≥0
{V¯ (x)− C¯(x)}. (47)
Assume also that V¯ (x) is concave, and that M(x) and C¯(x) are monotonically increasing
in x.3 Then the optimal firm plan is
F opt = V¯ (xmaxV¯,c ), T
opt =M(xmaxV¯,c ), p
opt ≥ pc, (48)
where
pc := max
x≥xmax
V¯,c
+δ

 V¯ (x)− V¯ (x
max
V¯,c
)∫M (x)
M (xmax
V¯,c
)
(y −M(xmax
V¯,c
))gx(y) dy

 (49)
and δ is the smallest time increment that is billed by the firm. In addition,
3These assumptions are very reasonable. They hold e.g., when V (x) is concave, Xx has additive
randomness (Xx = x+ Z), and C(x) is monotonically increasing.
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1. The minimal overage price satisfies 0 < pc <∞.
2. The consumer plans to talk xmax
V¯,c
minutes, where 0 < xmax
V¯,c
< xmaxV .
3. The consumer expected utility is zero.
4. The firm expected revenue is V¯ (xmax
V¯,c
)− C¯(xmax
V¯,c
).
Proof. We first note that 0 < pc < ∞, because the numerator is continuous and bounded
from above and below, and the denominator is continuous and bounded from below.
Suppose the consumer joins the plan (p, T, F ) and uses xopt
U¯
:= xopt
U¯
(p, T, F ) minutes.
By (44), 0 ≤ U¯opt(p, T, F ) = V¯ (xopt
U¯
)− Π¯(p, T, F )− S¯(xopt
U¯
). Subtracting C(x) from both
sides yields Π¯c(p, T, F ) ≤ V¯ (xoptU¯ ) − S¯(xoptU¯ , p, T ) − C¯(xoptU¯ ). Therefore, from (4) and (47)
we have that
Π¯c(p, T, F ) ≤ V¯ (xmaxV¯,c )− C¯(xmaxV¯,c ). (50)
Next, we show that if a firm plan satisfies (48), then
xopt
U¯
(p, T, F ) = xmaxV¯,c . (51)
To see that, it is enough to show that U¯(x, p, T, F ) ≤ U¯(xmax
V¯,c
, p, T, F
)
for x 6= xmax
V¯,c
.
1. If x < xmax
V¯,c
, since M(x) is monotonically increasing, then M(x) < M(xmax
V¯,c
) = T .
Therefore, the expected consumer utility is U¯(x, p, T, F ) = V¯ (x)− F. Since V¯ (x) is
concave and attains its maximum at xmax
V¯
, see (37), V¯ (x) is monotonically increasing
in x for 0 ≤ x ≤ xmax
V¯
. In addition, since V¯ (x) is concave and C¯(x) is monotonically
increasing, then xmax
V¯,c
< xmax
V¯
. Hence, V (x) < V (xmax
V¯,c
), and so U¯ (x, p, T, F ) <
V¯ (xmax
V¯,c
)− F = U¯(xmax
V¯,c
, p, T, F
)
.
2. If x > xmax
V¯,c
, since M(x) is monotonically increasing, then M(x) > M(xmax
V¯,c
) = T .
Therefore, the consumer exceeds T with a positive probability. Hence, p¯i(x, p, T, F ) =
F + p
∫ M (x)
T
(y − T ) gx(y) dy. Consequently,
U¯(x, p, T, F ) = V¯ (x)−S¯(x, p, T )−p¯i(x, p, T, F ) = V¯ (x)−S¯(x, p, T )−F−p
∫ M (x)
T
(y−T ) gx(y) dy.
Since S¯(x, p, T ) > 0, see (4), U¯(x, p, T, F ) < V¯ (x) − F − p ∫ M (x)
T
(y − T ) gx(y) dy <
V¯ (xmax
V¯,c
) − F = U¯(xmax
V¯,c
, p, T, F ), where the second inequality follows from (48)
and (49).
32
Finally, we show that if the firm plan satisfies (48), then Π¯(popt, T opt, F opt) = V¯ (xmax
V¯,c
)−
C¯(xmax
V¯,c
). Indeed, suppose the firm sets T opt = M(xmax
V¯,c
). Then for any popt > pc the
consumer will plan to use x = xmax
V¯,c
minutes, see (51). Therefore, the consumer expected
utility is U¯(xmax
V¯,c
, popt, T opt, F opt) = V¯ (xmax
V¯,c
)−F opt = 0. Hence, he signs up to the plan. In
this case, the firm revenue is Π¯c(p
opt, T opt, F opt) = F opt − C¯(x¯maxV,c ) = V¯ (xmaxV¯,c )− C¯(xmaxV¯,c ).
By (50), this is the maximal firm revenue.
B Proof of Lemma 5
By Proposition 1, the optimal firm plan that maximizes the revenue from the light users
satisfies F optL = V
max
L , p
opt
L ≥ 0 and T optL ≥ xmaxV,L . Since V maxH > V maxL = F optL , the heavy
users will sign up to the plan if poptL is sufficiently small. In order to extract overage
payments from the heavy users, the firm should set T optL < x
max
V,H . Since
∂UH
∂x
= V ′H(x)− p−
∂SH
∂x
= vH(x)− p− sH(x, p), (52)
if the firm sets p to be sufficiently small, then ∂UH
∂x
> 0 at x = T optL , since vH(x) > 0
for x < xmaxV,H , and p, sH(x, p) → 0 as p → 0. Hence, the heavy users will benefit from
exceeding T optL , and so the firm would gain additional revenues. Therefore, x
max
V,L < x
opt
U,H and
poptL > 0. We now show that T
opt
L = x
max
V,L . Indeed, assume by negation that T
opt
L > x
max
V,L .
Then if the firm slightly lowers T optL by ∆T  1, this will not affect the light users,
since they can still talk xmaxV,L . Under this change the heavy users will still use the same
number of minutes, since their usage xoptU,H is determined from
∂UH
∂x
= 0, see (7), and ∂UH
∂x
is
independent of T , see (52) and (19). Therefore, they will pay p∆T more to the firm, which is
in contradiction to the optimality of the plan. Finally, by (52), 0 = ∂UH
∂x
(xoptU,H) < V
′
H(x
opt
U,H).
Therefore, xoptU,H < x
max
V,H .
C Proof of Proposition 4
By Lemma 2, the only two plans that extract the maximal revenue from the light and
heavy users are F1 = V
max
L , T1 ≥ xmaxV,L , p1 ≥ 0, and F2 = V maxH , T2 ≥ xmaxV,H , p2 ≥ 0,
respectively. If the heavy users join (p2, T2, F2), their optimal utility is U
opt
H (p2, T2, F2) = 0,
see Proposition 1.
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1. If VH(x
max
V,L ) > VL(x
max
V,L ), they will prefer (p1, T1, F1), see (32), since
UoptH (p1, T1, F1) ≥ UH(xmaxV,L , p1, T1, F1) = VH(xmaxV,L )− F1 = VH(xmaxV,L )− VL(xmaxV,L ) > 0.
Hence, the firm will not extract the maximal revenue from the heavy users.
2. If VH(x
max
V,L ) < VL(x
max
V,L ), the heavy users will have a negative utility if they choose
plan (p1, T1, F1) and talk x ≤ xmaxV,L minutes, since VH(x) ≤ VH(xmaxV,L ) < VL(xmaxV,L ) =
F1. The firm can make sure that they also have a negative utility if they choose
plan (p1, T1, F1) and talk x
max
V,L < x ≤ xmaxV,H minutes, by setting T1 = xmaxV,L and
p1 ≥ maxxmax
V,L
<x≤xmax
V,H
V ′H(x), since in that case
UH(x, p1, T1, F1) ≤ VH(x)− F1 − p1(x− T1) = VH(xmaxV,L ) + (VH(x)− VH(xmaxV,L ))− F1 − p1(x− xmaxV,L )
< VL(x
max
V,L )− F1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(VH(x)− VH(xmaxV,L ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<p1(x−xmaxV,L )
−p1(x− xmaxV,L ) < 0.
D Proof of Lemma 6
As in the proof of Proposition 4, if there is a plan that the light consumers sign up to, and
if (33) holds, then the heavy consumers will prefer that plan to the one that extracts all
their valuation, and that plan does not maximize the revenue from the heavy consumers.
Conversely, if (33) does not hold, there exist x0 such that VL(x0) ≥ VH(x0). Therefore, if we
set p1 ≥ maxx0≤x≤xmaxV,H V ′H(x), T1 = x0, F1 = VL(x0), and p2 ≥ 0, T2 ≥ xmaxV,H , F2 = V maxH , the
light and heavy consumers will sign up to plans (p1, T1, F1) and (p2, T2, F2), respectively.
E Proof of Lemma 7
If plan (p1, T1, F1) maximizes the revenue from the light consumers, then
F1 = V
max
L , T1 ≥ xmaxV,L , p1 ≥ 0, (53)
see (10). The heavy consumers will choose plan (p2, T2, F2) provided that
UoptH (p2, T2, F2) ≥ UoptH (p1, T1, F1), (54)
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see (32).4 In addition, as in the proofs of Proposition 1 and 5, see (44), the firm revenue
from a heavy consumer is bounded by the difference between his maximal valuation and
his optimal utility if he joins (p1, T1, F1), i.e., Π
opt
H (p2, T2, F2) ≤ V maxH − UoptH (p1, T1, F1).
Since p1 ≥ V ′H(xmaxV,L ), if heavy consumers join (p1, T1, F1), they do not increase their utility
by exceeding the allowance T1. Hence,
UoptH (p1, T1, F1) = UH(x
max
V,L , p1, T1, F1) = VH(x
max
V,L )− F1 = VH(xmaxV,L )− V maxL . (55)
By the last two relations,
ΠoptH (p2, T2, F2) ≤ V maxH − (VH(xmaxV,L )− V maxL ). (56)
We now show that heavy consumers will choose plan (34b), and that the firm revenue
from (34b) is equal to the right-hand-side of (56). Therefore, plan (34b) maximizes the
revenue from the heavy consumers. If the heavy consumers join plan (34b), they talk xmaxV,H
minutes (i.e., as much as they want), and so their utility is UoptH (p2, T2, F2) = V
max
H −F2
(34b)
=
VH(x
max
V,L ) − V maxL . Since UoptH (p2, T2, F2) = UoptH (p1, T1, F1), see (55), they will sign up to
plan (34b), see (54), and so the firm revenue from a heavy consumer is
ΠoptH (p2, T2, F2) = F2, (57)
which is the optimal revenue from a heavy consumer, see (56) and (34b).
In order to show that the revenue from a light consumer is F1, we need to check that
she does not prefer plan (34b), i.e., that F1 < F2. Now, by (34),
F2 − F1 = V maxH − VH(xmaxV,L ) = VH(xmaxV,H)− VH(xmaxV,L ) > 0, (58)
where the last inequality follows from (2).
We thus see the average firm revenue per consumer is
Πtwo plans = γHF2 + (1− γH)F1 = γH(V maxH − VH(xmaxV,L )) + (1− γH)V maxL .
By Lemma 5, ΠL−mainly = V
max
L + γHp
opt
L (x
opt
U,H − xmaxU,L ), where xmaxU,L < xoptU,H < xmaxU,H . There-
4When UoptH (p2, T2, F2) = U
opt
H (p1, T1, F1) the heavy consumers are indifferent between join-
ing (p1, T1, F1) or (p2, T2, F2). Hence, in practice the firm will set slightly lower fixed cost F

2 :=
V maxH − UoptH (p1, T1, F1)− , so that the join (p2, T2, F2).
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fore, to show that Πtwo plans > ΠL−mainly, it is enough to show that
V maxH − VH(xmaxV,L ) > poptL (xoptU,H − xmaxV,L ). (59)
Now, V ′H(x
opt
U,H) ≥ poptL , since otherwise the heavy consumer will not use the xoptU,H minute.
Therefore, since V ′′H < 0,
V ′H(x) > p
opt
L , 0 ≤ x < xoptU,H. (60)
Hence, poptL (x
opt
U,H − xmaxV,L ) =
∫ xopt
U,H
xmax
V,L
poptL dx
(60)
<
∫ xopt
U,H
xmax
V,L
V ′H(x) dx = V (x
opt
U,H) − V (xmaxV,L ). Since
xoptU,H < x
max
U,H , then V (x
opt
U,H) < V
max
H . Therefore, we proved (59).
F Proof of Lemma 8
For 0 < ∆T  1 we define the plans
T−1 = x
max
V,L−∆T, F−1 = VL(T−1 ), p−1 =∞, T−2 = xmaxV,H , F−2 = V maxH −(VH(T−1 )−F−1 ), p−2 ≥ 0.
We now show that there exist ∆T sufficiently small such that
Πtwo plans(p1, T1, F1, p2, T2, F2) < Πtwo plans(p
−
1 , T
−
1 , F
−
1 , p
−
2 , T
−
2 , F
−
2 ).
Suppose the firm offers (p−i , T
−
i , F
−
i ), i = 1, 2. Light consumers join (p
−
1 , T
−
1 , F
−
1 ),
because V maxL < F
−
2 , see the proof of Lemma 7. Compared to (p1, T1, F1) the firm rev-
enue from light consumers decreases by nL(F1 − F−1 ) = nL(VL(xmaxV,L ) − VL(xmaxV,L − ∆T )).
Since V ′L(x
max
V,L ) = 0, see (2),
nL(F1 − F−1 ) ≈ nLV ′′L (xmaxV,L )(∆T )2, ∆T  1.
Similarly to Lemma 7, heavy consumers will join (p−2 , T
−
2 , F
−
2 ) and pay F
−
2 = V
max
H −
VH(T
−
1 ) + VL(T
−
1 ). Hence, the firm revenue from the heavy consumers increases by
nH(F
−
2 − F2) = nH
(
VH(x
max
V,L )− VH(xmaxV,L −∆T )
)− nH(VL(xmaxV,L )− VL(xmaxV,L −∆T )).
Since V ′L(x
max
V,L ) = 0 and V
′
H(x
max
V,L ) > 0, see (33),
nH(F
−
2 − F2) ≈ nHV −H (xmaxV,L )∆T.
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Therefore, if the firm changes to plans (p−i , T
−
i , F
−
i ), i = 1, 2, it gains O(∆T
2) less from
the light consumers but O(∆T ) more from the heavy ones.
G Proof of Lemma 11
By Proposition 5, the optimal firm revenue is Π¯ = V¯ max. In particular, the optimal firm
revenue from deterministic consumers is Π = V max. The result follows from the inequality
V¯ max = V¯ (xmax
V¯
)
(36)
=
∫M (x)
0
V (y)fxmax
V¯
(y) dy < V (xmax
V¯
)
∫M (x)
0
fxmax
V¯
(y) dy = V max, where the
sharp inequality follows from (2).
H Proof of Proposition 6
By Proposition 5, the optimal firm revenue is Π¯(w) = V¯ maxw , where V
max
w is the maximal
expected valuation when the stochastic demands are Xwx . Therefore, we need to show that
V¯ maxw < V¯
max
w′ , 0 ≤ w′ < w. (61)
In what follows, we will show that for every x and 0 ≤ w′ < w, there exists y = y(x, w, w′)
such that
V (x+ wz) < V (y + w′z). (62)
From this, it follows that V¯w(x) =
∫
V (x+wz) fZ(z) dz <
∫
V (y+w′z) fZ(z) dz = V¯w′(y),
where fZ(z) is the density distribution of Z. In particular, substituting x = x
max
V¯,w
yields
V¯ maxw = V¯w(x
max
V¯,w
) < V¯w′(y) ≤ V¯ maxw′ , which is (61).
To prove (62), let y = xmaxV +
w′
w
(x− xmaxV ). Then
xmaxV − (y + w′z) =
w′
w
(xmaxV − (x+ wz)) . (63)
Since w′ < w, then |xmaxV − (y+w′z)| = w
′
w
|xmaxV − (x+wz)| < |xmaxV − (x+wz)|, i.e., y+w′z
is closer to xmaxV than x+wz. In addition, since
w′
w
> 0, x+wz and y+w′z are on the same
side of xmaxV , see (63). Therefore, since V (x) is concave and since the global maximum
of V (x) is attained at xmaxV , we have (62).
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